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It was almost a rule, during the 1930s, for the most significant books on major current 
developments to emanate from the pens of journalists, rather than academicians. One 
has to recall only names like G.E.R. Gedye (Fallen Bastions), William Shirer (his various 
titles concerning the Third Reich), and, to some extent, even John Gunther (Inside 
almost anywhere). One might add another writer, Rebecca West (Black Lamb and Grey 
Falcon), although she was primarily a novelist.  
            
Since World War II, this phenomenon has become far less prevalent. In part, this is the 
result of the emergence of two academic fields that were barely visible during the 
1930s: International Relations and Contemporary History (Zeitgeschichte, which, for 
decades, was recognized as an independent discipline only in German-speaking 
countries). Consequently, academic works began to dominate current affairs.
To be sure, some journalists, like Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser, did produce useful 
works, but other foreign correspondents flitted from one place to another, so that their 
publications, at best, tended to be superficial, if not simply partisan. Moreover, when 
assigned to authoritarian polities, many a journalist became concerned more to avoid 
being expelled as persona non grata (not to mention being assassinated) than to 
present a truthful picture. (This phenomenon was not unknown in the 1930s, of course, 
to mention only the notorious case of Walter Duranty.) The Middle East provides a 
textbook example of this tendency. 
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Consequently, it is all the more noteworthy that two journalists, working in tandem, have 
been able now to produce a work that may be deemed definitive. It is truly scholarly, 
even absent the source notes that adorn academic publications; in-depth interviews, 
based upon meticulous research, compensate for the material that the archives won’t 
disgorge for decades. Peter Baker’s and Susan Glasser’s Kremlin Rising: Vladimir 
Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolution in eighteen chapters confronts almost every 
possible aspect of the deplorable retrogression (other than in terms of purely economic 
criteria) that the Russian polity and people are experiencing under the rule of the 
siloviki.
Yet the book does so without indulging in excessively harsh epithets. The authors are 
devoid of the “Russophobia” that certain circles unfailingly accuse Vladimir Putin’s critics 
of harboring. Indeed, Baker and Glasser reveal their deep empathy for the talented 
Russian people whose history has been overshadowed by “appallingly bad luck” (to use 
Robert Conquest’s words) and by the regimes that have resulted. The authors include a 
noteworthy reference that demonstrates how Putin’s “power vertical” is approaching a 
“cult of personality.” In referring to his United Russia party, the book says that “the 
Kremlin figured any concrete positions the party took would just lose them support. 
Talking about Putin was the only safe course. ‘The rest interfered,’ [said one of the 
President’s henchmen]. ‘Only Putin unites.’”
            
Given a work of such excellence, it may seem pedantic to quibble about shortcomings 
that concern almost entirely Russia’s external affairs. (Alas, one has to remind the 
American reader repeatedly that Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan concern 
Moscow’s international – not its domestic – relations.)  Correctly, the book says that 
“Putin demonstrated a neo-imperial streak, throwing  his weight around in former Soviet 
republics.” However, it proceeds to state that he “typically used economic rather  than 
military pressure to keep neighbors in line, such as cutting off natural gas to Georgia or 
Belars when their leadership irritated him.”
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Unfortunately that is far from the whole story: Russian military “garrisons” in Georgia 
that were supposed to be evacuated years ago, under repeated international 
agreements, are being abandoned only now in a classical example of foot dragging. 
Moreover, Russian “peace-keepers” that were inserted unilaterally between Georgia 
and its breakaway province of Abkhazia continue with their real task, namely to prevent 
the return of 250,000 ethnic Georgian refugees who were expelled by 90,000 Abkhaz 
mountaineers. The latter were able to achieve this unlikely success after receiving a 
(Russian) navy and air force in the greatest miracle since the loaves and the fishes.     
            
The Russian 14th Army, whose sole purpose appears to be the prevention of the 
reunion between Moldova and its separatist province of Transdniestr, continues in place 
despite repeated promises. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, that was supposed to receive 
limited pier space in the Ukrainian harbor of Sevastopol, ended up by taking the whole 
harbor (indeed, Moscow’s Mayor Luzkhov now claims the whole city for Russia).
These actions have major legal implications since they deal with the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of new members of the international community whose independence 
was recognized first by Russia itself. After Russia unilaterally extended Russian 
citizenship to most of the inhabitants of the rebel provinces, a bill was tabled at the 
Duma providing for the admission to the Russian Federation of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, and Transdniestr. Moreover, members of both houses of Russia’s legislature 
now claim that this would be the natural culmination of the process of extending 
Russian citizenship. Of course, such moves invoke sinister memories of the 1930s 
when sovereign states, or portions thereof, were annexed by an expansionistic power 
under the pretext of ethnic affinity or “self-determination.” 
                        
It would have been helpful if Kremlin Rising had spelled out these implications of Putin’s 
“neo-imperial streak.” However, there is another problem. The book states that “Putin 
believed that the key to restoring Russia as a great power was economic” and “Russia 
was flirting again with Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Thanks to oil and nuclear contracts, 
Iran and Iraq represented important trading partners. Money was at stake....” This 
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approach reflects a joke of the 1980s, which asserted that “democratic America believes 
that all problems are really economic, whereas Marxist-Leninist Russia knows that 
they’re actually issues of political power.” 
            
As indicated by the examples mentioned, Russia does not confine the flexing of its 
muscles to economic measures. Moreover, this is indicated by another aspect of 
Russian external relations that Kremlin Rising might have spelled out. Russia’s foreign 
currency income, it is true, rests heavily upon the sale of energy and of weapons. A 
closer look at the latter, however, demonstrates that economic considerations may not 
be uppermost. In at least two major instances, Russia has offered sizeable packages of 
state-of-the-art weaponry to countries already heavily in debt to Moscow. In the Syrian 
case, some $10 billion was owed for earlier arms deals with the USSR; the new 
Russian proposal entailed forgiving two thirds of that debt and adding another $2 billion! 
“Throwing good money after bad” may be a fair description and it shows, surely, that the 
main incentive was not economic. Syria is no more capable of repaying such a debt 
now than it was before.
            
President Putin has just signed into law a measure erasing a debt of over $4.7 billion 
owed by Algeria. This is part of a new deal, whereby Algeria will receive at least $7.5 
billion worth of new Russian weapons. Yet, Algeria has made no payments since 2000. 
It would be reasonable to view such arrangements as intended to build leverage, but, 
surely, at least as much political and geo-strategic as economic pull. 
            
These points are not meant to detract from the judgment that Kremlin Rising is an 
excellent work and that the omissions referred to reflect the understandable 
preoccupation of the authors with the Russian domestic scene. Yet Russia’s neo-
imperial actions vis-à-vis the other sovereign post-Soviet republics, that are full 
members of the international community, have sinister implications that require 
extensive analysis.
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